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The Neutrality of the American Lakes and Anglo-American Relations.

By JAMES MORTON CALLAHAN, Ph. D. (Baltimore : The Johns Hopkins Press. 1898. Pp. 199.)

MR. CALLAHAN's study of our international relations on the northern lake border is published in the Johns Hopkins *Studies*. It is a book of nearly 200 pages, with wide margins and copious citations of sources. The introduction gives a general sketch of the American policy as to the neutralization of the lakes. The subsequent chapters deal with the lake boundary in the treaty of 1783, the struggle for supremacy in those waters and the adjacent regions (ending in 1815), the agreement of 1817, and the disturbances threatening the permanence of that agreement arising from the Canadian rebellion of 1837, our northeastern and northwestern boundary disputes, the Civil War, and the Fenian raids, and from various incidental causes. Finally it is shown how the agreement has been continued, and how beneficent have been its results.

Mr. Callahan's work is painstaking, and gives what seems to be an exhaustive sketch of the subject. In newspaper citations possibly he is a trifle too conscientious. How far public opinion is really reflected by newspaper editorials or communications is always an open question. At all events, the mere existence of such an article is slender evidence of anything beyond the editorial hope that it may be interesting to somebody.

The diction is occasionally careless. "Mr. Bagot could not be rushed" (p. 12), "The British general, McNabb, had Captain Drew to anchor two schooners" (p. 95), "Adams was led to suspicion that England was simply amusing the United States" (p. 79), are cases in point. Such expressions as "old musty maxims of diplomacy" (p. 19) and "notwithstanding occasional waves of jingoism" (p. 22-3) are mere cant. "Haldiman" (p. 37) is doubtless a misprint. The name is correct on p. 30. The American commissioners at Ghent in 1814 were not "ministers" (p. 51, note 2). However, these are trifling slips in a thorough piece of work.

The agreement of 1817 was a very sensible thing. It has saved mutual rivalry in expense, and, what is still more important, it has doubtless saved irritating friction. The parade of strong naval squadrons on the great lakes would be an absurdity. Naval power on salt water is a very different matter, for the ocean is the highway of the world. On the lakes, however, Great Britain and the United States are absolutely alone, and it would be ridiculous for the two nations to make naval faces at each other across these isolated fresh-water ponds.

The compact of 1817 has usually been called an "arrangement" or an "agreement," with the implication that it is not a treaty. The difference is, after all, not very easy to point out. The agreement received the assent of the British crown, which is all that is necessary to the validity of any treaty so far as Great Britain is concerned. To be sure effect was given to the arrangement by both governments without refer-

ence to the American Senate, on the assumption that it was a mere administrative agreement. But in April, 1818, President Monroe submitted the matter to the consideration of the Senate, and that body promptly ratified it. It would seem that such ratification was essential to the complete validity of the arrangement. One condition is that "If either party should be hereafter desirous of annulling this stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party, it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from the date of such notice." Now, of course, it is competent for any president to make an agreement with reference to a mutual disarmament, and he will then be bound in honor to carry it out. If a part of this agreement involves a six months' notice as a prerequisite to annulment, there is no doubt that this, too, he would be under moral obligation to maintain. But, surely, no such mere personal compact could be legally binding on any successor. No foreign government would be entitled to demand the six months' notice as an international right. To make such stipulation a legal obligation on the government of the United States it would be necessary that it be an agreement, not merely of the Executive, who is not empowered by the constitution to make compacts with foreign nations, but of the constitutional treaty-making power. In point of fact this has been done in case of the "agreement" of 1817. It was made by the President and confirmed by the Senate. That being the case, and, as has been seen, the agreement also having been ratified by the British treaty-making power, it would seem that the "arrangement," the "agreement" of 1817, is to all intents and purposes a treaty, and as such is legally binding on both parties.

HARRY PRATT JUDSON.

A Memoir of Robert C. Winthrop, 1809–1894, prepared for the Massachusetts Historical Society by ROBERT C. WINTHROP, JR. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1897. Pp. vi, 358.)

FEW men could be named in all that portion of our history in which he lived—save only the great characters of the war period itself—whose memoir will be welcomed by a greater number and variety of readers than that of Robert C. Winthrop. Rare indeed have been the men, distinguished in any sphere or specialty of active life, who have been permitted to labor on and win in it an abiding name, for the long years—well nigh three score and ten—which were the lot to the subject of this memoir. But his was no special work. Indeed what is written over his tomb at Mount Auburn, "Eminent as a Scholar, an Orator, a Statesman and a Philanthropist,—above all a Christian," does but faintly measure the full scope of his life-work, active to the end. Mr. Winthrop's personality, so unlike that of any other one who lived in his time in this country, was carried into everything he did, and into all his public career, making everything pertaining to him and his work especially interesting. This book is not his "Life" nor his "Works." They have been many years